Kenya’s 2017 polls will be remembered as the election of minor gains and confounding contradictions.
As the grand finale of a dynastic struggle between the Odinga and Kenyatta families, both candidates boldly manipulated the ethnic formula while their supporters once again demonstrated a stubborn fixation with traditional voting patterns. This is reflected in the results from the presidential candidates’ ethnic strongholds.
Despite these failings, the Kenyan people handed Kenyatta a comfortable second term.
On top of this, some of the blunders and disturbing trends witnessed in previous elections were repeated. These included social media hate speech; a high-profile murder; poor communication from the electoral commission when it came to relaying results; inadequate voter education; and inflammatory statements by leading figures when provisional election results were released.
At the national level, Kenyans seem to have repeated a monotonous script that suggests a resistance to learning from past mistakes.
At the micro level, the results were mixed, delivering both positive and negative outcomes. Promising candidates such as social-justice activist Boniface Mwangi, who campaigned on a platform of ethics and integrity, failed to make the cut. But others, like Anne Waiguru, a former cabinet secretary implicated in corruption and Professor Anyang Nyong’o, whose nomination was contested in the primaries, pulled through.
On the positive side, three women made forays into governorships thus paving the way for more women to join the fray in future. And in some regions like Eastern Province, people resisted major political party dominance by re-electing individuals from minor parties, which is laudable.
At the same time, some regions such as Rift Valley province maintained their strong Jubilee Party leanings as seen in the punitive ouster of Isaac Ruto who ditched the Jubilee Party for his own Chama cha Mashinani.
These dynamics are suggestive of a palpable tension between progress and the status quo. It remains to be seen which will prevail.
Only one winner
Ultimately, there could only be one winner between the two presidential choices. President Kenyatta was poised to clinch a second term for obvious reasons. He is highly personable and seems to enjoy strong political chemistry with his supporters. He also boasts strong social media credentials – he skipped this year’s presidential debate, opting instead to directly engage his supporters on Facebook.
With the incumbency in his favour, he campaigned on the platform of his first term track record and projected the confidence to finish the job.
But there was also something more sinister that played in his favour. He has perfected the art of insulating himself from the controversies that have rocked his government. His deputy, William Ruto has been the shock absorber that has taken the flak over alleged links to various corruption scandals and political machinations.
The fact that Kenyatta has not been directly linked to corruption made him appear more trustworthy. Even though he has been sluggish in acting on graft and inefficiency, some of the minor cabinet shake-ups he stimulated seemed to have paid off.
These actions helped him retain his 2013 strongholds while giving the impression that he can also act tough.
After securing a comfortable win, Kenyatta is no longer a political hostage who is constrained by the appeasement of first term allies. Does this mean that he’ll develop a firm hand to tackle some of the issues that have dogged his government? If he does, he might just turn out to be the political pill that the doctor ordered for Kenyans.
End of an era
Raila Odinga, Kenya’s veteran political stalwart, has a strong track record as a champion for political reforms, and is loved and disliked in equal measure. This is the fourth time he has vied for the presidency and lost even though questions persist over the disputed 2007 and 2013 election results.
Odinga lost the 2017 elections for two reasons. Some voters buckled under the weight of “Raila fatigue” and accompanying disillusionment. Both can be partly attributed to the fact that he has lost at every shot he’s made at the presidency.
Odinga missed the opportunity to exit the political stage at the apex of his political calling.
Granted, several other issues worked against him such as a weak internal party democracy, allegations of corruption and a disorganised campaign machine. That said, he should now consolidate his legacy by nurturing other leaders who are passionate about social reforms.
For their part, the elections provide the Kenyan people with yet another opportunity to demand more accountability from the leaders they have voted into power. – Written by PhD Candidate in Politics and International Studies, University of Adelaide
Originally published in The Conversation
Ghana Hopes To Benefit From Hosting Africa’s Free Trade Area Secretariat
Ghana has been chosen by the African Union (AU) to host the secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Area. It beat other competing countries including Egypt, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar and Senegal to win the bid.
As a free trade area, member countries have come together and agreed not to impose tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers on goods and services. The agreement is expected to enlarge markets and diversify exports, particularly manufactured goods.
According to US-based think tank the Brookings Institute, intra-African trade stands at about 14%, while the share of manufactured goods to the rest of the world stands at 18%. Trade among Asian countries is much higher – at 59% – and even higher among European countries at 69%. The hope is that the African free trade area will boost trade across the continent by 52% by 2022 .
The core mandate of the secretariat will be to implement the free trade agreement, which has been ratified by 25 out of 54 countries. Once all have ratified the deal, it will create the world’s largest free trade area since the formation of the World Trade Organisation in 1995.
Africa’s free trade area will cover a market of 1.2 billion people with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$2.5 trillion.
The secretariat’s job will be to recruit personnel, train them, and develop organisational capability. The secretariat will also have to implement policies handed down by the governing body, keep the media informed, organise conferences and identify potential funding sources. It will also monitor and evaluate the progress of policies and programmes.
This is a first for Ghana which has not hosted a continental secretariat. The hope is that it can emulate the success of other African capitals that have befitted from hosting the AU and the United Nations.
Addis Ababa is home to the AU headquarters while Nairobi hosts two of the UN’s biggest bodies. For its part, South Africa hosts the Pan-African Parliament.
The presence of the AU in Addis Ababa has been credited with an increase in property valuations as well as job creation.
In making its bid, Ghana took advantage of its strategic geographical location in West Africa. It has put a great deal of effort into making the country a gateway and a trade hub in West Africa.
Hosting the free trade area secretariat will come with costs and benefits – direct and indirect.
In establishing its credentials to host the secretariat, the Ghanaian government would have set out the country’s most notable achievements.
These would have included the fact that it’s been an exemplary member of the AU. For example, in 2007 it was among the first countries to be reviewed by the African Peer Review Mechanism – the self-assessment mechanism used to measure good governance.
The fact that it put its hand up sent a signal to other countries that the peer review process was credible.
Other factors that would have played in Ghana’s favour are that the country’s economy has been showing strong growth.
It is one of the fastest growing economies in the world with an averageGDP growth of about 6%. In addition, it comes second to Cape Verde in West Africa in terms of the United Nations Human Development index.
In one of the most unstable sub regions in the world, Ghana also has a tradition of relative peace and security, a key parameter for hosting a secretariat.
In addition, Ghana has had the advantage of learning about trade collaboration through its membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas).
Costs and benefits
Ghana has been part of the 15-member Ecowas since its formation in 1990. The regional body introduced a common external tariff in 2015 .
While Ghana has enjoyed benefits from the arrangement, like many other West African States, it has not been able to harness its full potential. For example, border controls remain cumbersome, delaying transits due to the numerous check points, huge unofficial payments at the borders.
The most direct cost to the country will be the $10 million pledged by President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo to support setting up the secretariat. The AU is also expected to contribute funds and appeals have been made to international funding agencies.
Ghana’s hope is that hosting the secretariat will boost the hospitality sector – and more broadly the services sector – and generate increased international exposure.
There should also be a boost for job creation as the secretariat hires staff; ranging from economists to translators, administrators and technicians.
There is no clear deadline on when the secretariat is expected to be up and running. The AU itself still has to clear a number of hurdles, including adopting a structure, staff rules and regulations, and the secretariat’s budget.
Archive Documents Reveal The US And UK’s Role In The Dying Days Of Apartheid
It is a quarter of a century since the end of apartheid in South Africa. But it’s easy to forget how complex, difficult and violent the birth of full democracy really was. This was particularly true in KwaZulu-Natal, where battles between the African National Congress (ANC) and the mainly Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) claimed the lives of as many as 20,000 in the decade between 1984 and 1994.
In the three months before the first elections in April 1994 an estimated 1 000 people were killed. The British and Americans were becoming increasingly concerned. The conflict between Inkatha and the ANC was just one crisis: another was developing with far right white extremists, who were threatening to resort to violence.
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that there was an:
eight in 10 chance that violence will surge immediately before and during the election, when emotions are at their highest.
The agency also warned of the threat of a right wing coup, although it considered this “unlikely”. (This CIA report is available in hard copy only.)
As the situation grew increasingly tense, Britain’s Prime Minister John Major and the US’s President Bill Clinton became personally involved. Their interventions are shown in documents just released by the UK National Archives.
The documents reveal just what a close-run thing the first truly democratic election was, and how much time and effort Britain and the USA spent ensuring that the voting went ahead.
Prime Minister Major took a phone call from Nelson Mandela on 22 February, in which the ANC leader described the situation as “very difficult.” Major briefed Mandela on a meeting between the British ambassador and the Inkatha leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi. He gave Mandela a full account of the conversation, which he warmly welcomed.
On 24 February there is the first indication of a joint Anglo-American mediation effort to resolve the crisis. This arose during planning for a visit to Washington by Major three days later.
Our starting point is that the situation has now deteriorated to the point where it seems very unlikely that left to themselves the South Africans will reach an agreement that will enable to participate in the elections. The consequences are likely to be very serious.
The British suggested that Major and Clinton might “offer their joint help to the transition process”.
The following day – having held discussions with Mandela, Buthelezi and President Frederik de Klerk – the British ambassador in Pretoria, Sir Anthony Reeve, was able to report that all three were prepared to go along with the Anglo-American initiative, although with some reservations. The ambassador concluded:
These responses do, I think, give us the green light to consult the Americans in detail on our thinking.
The proposal was discussed between Mandela and Buthelezi at a meeting on March 1 and both leaders agreed to “explore” the possibility of international mediation. Lord Carrington, who had negotiated the end of Rhodesia and its transition to Zimbabwe in 1980, was on a lecture tour of South Africa. He was approached by the ANC’s Thabo Mbeki who asked whether he might act as one of a panel of mediators.
Others suggested were US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Tanzanian head of state Julius Nyerere.
There followed intensive discussions between London and Washington, over how such mediation might work; indeed, Carrington and Kissinger travelled to South Africa. In the end a failure to agree on the terms of reference for the mediators, and South African government fears that the elections might be delayed, put paid to the plan.
It has been claimed the crisis – the most immediate was that Buthelezi was threatening to boycott the poll – was resolved by surprising last minute mediation by Kenyan Professor, John Okumu. Other Commonwealth envoys who had excellent contacts with both the ANC leadership and Buthelezi, including the late Ghanaian diplomat Moses Anafu, doubt this, arguing that forces that led Buthelezi into the election were much bigger.
Indeed, Buthelezi’s brinkmanship had ensured key constitutional concessions. Okumu’s intervention seems then a face-saving device for the IFP leader. A joint statement was agreed between Mandela, Buthelezi and de Klerk on 19 April, which allowed the election to take place just a week later (April 26-28).
It had been a close-run thing and South Africa’s first truly democratic election almost came to grief. But there were two more potential obstacles.
In the tense run-up to polling day, a report on the role of the apartheid state in stoking internal tension and violence was published. The Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, led by Justice Richard Goldstone had been established in 1991: its report was published on 21 April 1994.
Judge Goldstone’s investigations revealed that sections of the South African Police had armed Inkatha, and pointed to attempts by senior police officers to subvert the work of his enquiry.
The charges were explosive and for a while the judge and his family were clearly at risk from white extremists. With de Klerk’s support and the knowledge of Mandela, Goldstone, his wife and a “key witness” (a former South African police officer) asked whether they might come to Britain. John Major agreed, and they were given temporary asylum and a safe house.
The second obstacle was the South African government’s clandestine chemical and biological weapons programme, known as “Project Coast.”The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, contacted Washington about the possibility of issuing a formal public protest unless President de Klerk publicly admitted his government’s involvement in the use of these weapons against ANC and Namibian prisoners.
The British had apparently intervened to prevent the proliferation of these weapons to other rogue states or terrorist groups. On April 11 the US and British ambassadors delivered their protest to President de Klerk – which apparently did the trick.
There was an agreement that all the chemical and biological systems would be destroyed and one of the key South African experts, Wouter Basson, who had travelled to Libya on several occasions, was subsequently prosecuted.
The April 1994 election proved to be a watershed for South Africa. In technical terms, the election was a fiasco, but it was a political triumph, according to the Commonwealth’s leading election official, Carl Dundass. Inkatha’s surprising victory in Natal-KwaZulu strongly suggest Natal “horsetrading” involved overturning an actual ANC victory to manage anticipated post-election violence.
Despite all the violence, tension and drama the election ended apartheid and allowed Major to phone Mandela with his congratulations – a highly satisfactory conclusion to an intense period of international diplomacy.
-Sue Onslow; Reader, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study
-Martin Plaut; Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study
‘South Africans Love Martyrs’
The first 100 days of any presidency are often harshly scrutinized as they set the tone for what citizens expect. South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa is under the magnifying glass as all await his next tactical move.
At the end of May, South Africa’s sixth democratically-elected president, Cyril Ramaphosa, took an oath of office at Loftus Versfeld Stadium in Pretoria. In his speech, he touched on many issues that resonate with South Africans, including corruption, poverty, equality and youth unemployment.
These burning matters prelude what is to be expected from him in his first 100 days in office.
Ramaphosa’s period at the helm of power (before the elections) has been typified by repeated calls for a ‘New Dawn’. It seems the man who made it to the 2019 Time magazine list of 100 Most Influential in the world has a laundry list of issues to attend to if he is to set the tone for the rest of his presidency.
The challenge that has deeply affected how South Africans and investors view the country is that of corruption.
“Let us forge a compact for an efficient, capable and ethical state, a state that is free of corruption, for companies that generate social value and propel human development… We must be a society that values excellence, rewards effort and rejects mediocrity,” Ramaphosa said at his inauguration on May 25.
In the first 100 days, analysts say he needs to demonstrate he is a proactive leader; one who takes decisive action to address the plight of those who live in a society as unequal as South Africa. The gaping chasm between the richest and poorest has widened since the end of apartheid 25 years ago. This information is not lost on citizens whose lived experiences and disenchantment were in evidence during the elections.
A specialist in social economic development and political commentator, Kim Heller, is of the view that Ramaphosa has some way to go to address the resolutions of his party, the African National Congress (ANC).
“There are critical social maladies that need to be treated with the urgency they deserve… One of the key things people are looking for is a decisive man and decisive leadership,” she says.
Political analyst, Prince Mashele, ventures: “He is yet to act on resolutions because he is navigating complex political infighting in the ANC, which is why he can’t move boldly and faster…”
Economic transformation has been seen to also imply redistribution of the means of production, which currently has been reiterated in the call for land redistribution without compensation. This is among the duties citizens and investors will keep a close eye on as it is a contentious matter.
Leading up to the elections, Ramaphosa said to apprehensive farmers, “the land reform process is something we should never fear. It is going to be done in terms of the constitution”.
Heller says that, “the question of land is unresolved, despite very solid ANC resolutions from branches, and despite extensive consultation”.
The president will to have to choose whether he wants to be investor-friendly or whether he wants the interests of his own political party to find expression in policy.
“The investors have become the supreme branch of the ANC. So Ramaphosa certainly, is spending a lot of time on their concerns rather than ordinary people…,” Heller says.
READ MORE | Poll Position: The South African 2019 Elections
Mashele echoes: “He has been a market-friendly president. He has railed against his comrades calling for the nationalization of the [South African] Reserve Bank”.
Another matter influencing investment into the country is red tape that inhibits instead of encouraging business. South Africa dropped from 34 out of 181 countries on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking in 2009 to 82 out of 192 countries last year, leaving the country trailing its African peers, including Mauritius (20), Rwanda (29) and Kenya (61).
In his address to the nation, Ramaphosa continued with the mantra thuma mina (which means ‘send me’) and committed to continue to build South Africa. In his rebuilding, he will have to take a closer look at the factors that infringe on those looking to conduct business while straddling the line in ensuring that (natural) resources are not further depleted while failing to trickle down to those who need it the most.
Heller is of the view that the expectations created by the president serve as a double-edged sword: “Some quarters have built him up to be the Messiah we have all been waiting for. He may have embraced that but it’s actually going to damage him. Because there is no individual who can save this country without looking at doing serious things in terms of economic restructuring… Until we address structural issues in this country, shifting the economy to favor ordinary people, not markets, we actually aren’t very benevolent.”
Also affecting business has been the view that South Africa is amongst the most corrupt on the continent and viewed as one of the murder capitals of the world. The Zondo Commission has illustrated the stark reality of the malfeasance the president will have to address to change these perceptions and in so doing, hold high-profile individuals accountable.
In line with building an equal society, the president made mention of the prevalence of violence against women at his inauguration.
“Let us end the dominion that men claim over women, the denial of opportunity, the abuse and the violence, the neglect, and the disregard of each person’s equal rights. Let us build a truly non-racial society, one that belongs to all South Africans, and in which all South Africans belong. Let us build a society that protects and values those who are vulnerable and who for too long have been rendered marginal,” Ramaphosa said.
Leading up to the resolution of the president’s first 100 days in office, the public is watching with bated breath.
“I pity him. He’s made big promises on housing and unemployment. Those are not going to magically change overnight. The problem with South Africa is that we love martyrs and here we have a president that we have martyred and who is actually going to fall on that. To replace one man with another, is not going to replace problematic policies, poor implementation and poor conceptualization of economic solutions. So I think in the next 100 days, I don’t expect to see anything unless the fundamentals are changed,” Heller says.
No doubt, it is going to take a concerted effort from all institutions, including those that have been revealed to be compromised. The first 100 days will certainly determine the rest of the president’s term in office.
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